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Abstract. In the essay “What is Freedom?”, Hannah Arendt argues that freedom 
is the meaning, the “raison d’être” of politics and that political life from which it 
is absent is meaningless (Arendt 1977, 161). Hardly anyone denies the importance 
of freedom for any human or political society. It is no novelty either that freedom 
is a highly contested conception, the meaning of which is bound up with 
numerous controversies and disagreements. Yet, it is customary to distinguish 
between the “negative” and “positive” concepts of liberty in accordance with the 
dualistic framework presented by Isaiah Berlin in 1969. Notwithstanding its 
popularity, this categorization is at very least problematic. This paper elaborates 
on the Machiavellian understanding of freedom, which arguably cannot fit in 
Berlin’s categorization. Besides, it draws parallels with Hanna Arendt’s 
understanding of political freedom and argues that the complexity of her 
conception challenges the validity of Berlin’s framework. 
 





Needless to say, the definition of freedom has served a topic for a 
hefty debates in political thought1. The aim of the following essay is 
twofold. The first section examines the Machiavellian conception of 
liberty while resting its focus on his influential work The Discourses on 
Livy. The second section elaborates on the relevance of Machiavelli’s 
conception of liberty in contemporary political philosophy and 
examines it through the prism of Isaiah Berlin’s dualistic framework. 
Furthermore, the paper draws a comparison between Machiavelli’s 
and Arendt’s viewpoints. It elaborates on the main similarities and 
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differences between Arendt’s conception of republican freedom 
and Machiavelli’s libertà. By referring to Quentin Skinner, I will argue 
that Machiavelli’s conception, albeit arguably in political terms, still 
is not straightforwardly positive and suggest that this constitutes one 
of the main differences between Arendt’s and Machiavelli’s 
understandings. 
To begin with, significant controversies lurk behind Machiavelli’s 
notion. Marcia L. Colish distinguishes between three main 
understandings of liberty (libertà): first, it is the understanding of 
liberty in a commonplace, which may entail freedom from physical 
capacity as freedom from political action enjoyed by the ruling force 
(Colish 1971, 324). Colish argues that liberty, in common sense, can 
also denote a person’s financial position. Hence, in the reading of 
Colish, this understanding of Machiavellian freedom does not 
necessarily have to be political. As Colish maintains, free men are 
defined as the ones who act “on their own initiative, as opposed to 
those who act as other people's agents” and, therefore, “free-from” 
may constitute a synonym for “lacking in” or “enjoying the absence 
of” (Colish 1971, 325).  
According to Colish, another understanding of freedom in 
Machiavelli is free will, which is conceived as an “attribute of human 
nature” (Colish 1971, 325). Colish argues that the notion of free 
refers to human independence. Machiavelli “upholds the dignity of 
man’s free will” and suggests that a human being is capable to 
express his free will “in the face of fortuna” and “by the “exercise of 
Virtu” (Colish 1971, 326)22. 
Finally, a purely political conception of liberty is referred as 
Corporate Libertà. According to this concept, cities are free when they 
are in possession of autonomy and are governed by their own laws 
instead of being subject to the rule of foreigners (Colish 1971 327). 
On the other hand, one should consider that in Machiavelli’s 
political thought the distinction between political and individual 
freedoms might not be straightforward, but these two are 
intrinsically linked.  
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According to Samuel Salzborn, the main end of establishing a 
stable state, according to Machiavelli, is to secure individual 
freedom, which is not compatible with autocracy (Salzborn 2015, 
29): “In Machiavelli’s conception, ‘the voice of the people’ is likened 
to ‘the voice of God’, because he considers the people to be smarter, 
more reliable and of better judgment than its rulers” (Salzborn 2015, 
29). Therefore, in Salzborn’s reading, Machiavelli praises the people 
who founded republics for their virtue and their love of liberty.  
Regarding the role of a people and its willingness to be free, the 16th 
chapter of The Discourses on Livy is particularly interesting. 
Machiavelli draws attention to the difficulty to maintain freedom for 
those people who have not acquired it by themselves. He further 
maintains that for a people who lived under the governance of a 
prince, the maintenance of freedom can present an insurmountable, 
yet a “reasonable difficulty” (Discourses 1.16, 44). He compares 
people who did not put any effort in the acquisition of freedom to 
a wild animal, which “although ferocious and feral nature has always 
been nourished in prison and in servitude” (Discourses 1.16, 44). 
One can argue that, for Machiavelli, it is the people who acquires 
and establishes its own freedom; however, for obtaining freedom, 
the joint action is required. In the same chapter, Machiavelli says:  
 
(…) the common utility that is drawn from a free way of life is not recognized 
by anyone while it is possessed: this is being able to enjoy one's things freely, 
without any suspicion, not fearing for the honour of wives and that of 
children, not to be afraid for oneself (Discourses 1.16, 45). 
 
Skinner interprets this passage as freedom has the meaning of being 
unobscured in terms of whatever ends they choose to pursue 
themselves (Skinner 1984, 205). Upon this reasoning, freedom 
seems to be conceived in an individualist rather than in communal 
sense.  
On the other hand, Machiavelli maintains that if corruption is 
ubiquitous in people’s affairs, they will not be able to be exercise 
freedom. In this regard, his understanding of freedom is public, 
communal. There are two main desires that move people: “one, to 
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be avenged against those who are the cause that it is servile; the 
other, to recover its freedom” (Discourses 1.16, 46). As for to why 
people are willing to be free, the philosopher suggests that only a 
small part want freedom to command, whereas most of them desire 
to be free in order to lead secure lives (Discourses 1.16, 46).  
Besides, in the Machiavellian thought, one of the meanings of 
freedom is political independence and self-governance3. Rome, 
according to him, had a free beginning, “without depending on 
anyone” (Discourses, 1.49.1, 100). It is abundantly clear that this 
understanding relates itself to the conception of sovereignty. As 
Maurizio Viroli rightly observes, Machiavelli’s conception of liberty, 
which, in its sense, is republican, is beyond the scope of the rule of 
law and touches upon participation in a “sovereign deliberation”, 
appointment of the magistrates, free expression in deliberative 
bodies and councils (Viroli 1998, 6). Viroli points out that a political 
man, for Machiavelli, commits himself to a political community, to 
a republic (Viroli 1998, 7). It can be argued, therefore, that the 
political conception of liberty is bound up with the notion of 
patriotism, love of the country, “which unites the citizens of a free 
republic” and “presupposes a sense of belonging and common-
sense which only equal and free citizens can experience and cherish” 
(Viroli 1998, 150). 
Furthermore, Machiavelli states that the foundation of freedom 
and the beginning of a new order requires extraordinary action. One 
needs to go for the extraordinary means, “such as violence and 
arms” in order to acquire or maintain freedom (Discourses, 1.18, 4). 
One example is the murder of Romulus by Remus, which, in the 
case of Rome, would be a precondition for the acquisition of 
freedom (Discourses, 1.8).  
However, this example generates controversy. As the title of 
Machiavelli’s Ninth Discourse goes, “it is necessary to be alone if one 
wishes to order a republic anew or to perform it altogether outside 
its ancient orders”. This line of thought seems to be controversial, 
given the importance of Machiavelli bestows upon people’s action 
to establish freedom. This argument challenges Viroli’s account, 
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too. Mansfield and Tarcov, interpret “being alone” as “the necessity 
of any ordering to depend on a single mind” (Mansfield and Tarcov 
1996, 23). Therefore, ‘being alone’ can be translated into a 
‘unanimity’, which people can jointly achieve.  
For the acquisition of freedom, the notion of the beginning is 
crucial. In this regard, Machiavelli develops quite a deterministic 
approach. He holds that whereas drafting freedom-supporting laws 
is difficult for a state with free beginnings, the ones with servile 
beginnings will be unable to govern themselves with just and 
freedom sustaining law (1.49,100). Machiavelli provides the example 
of Rome, which had a free beginning but had difficulties to maintain 
it, whereas Florence and Venice, the beginnings of which were 
servile, “were never able to reorder themselves” (Discourses, 1.49, 
101). Machiavelli holds that, for Rome, whilst it was corrupt, making 
new laws was necessary in order to acquire freedom and establish 
new orders, which would be completely different from the former 
ones (Discourses, 1.18, 51). He conceives two options in terms of 
how the new order can be established: one envisages a sudden 
transition from one order to another; the other is a gradual transition 
that entails universal recognition of new laws.  
Another important topic is addressed through the separation of 
plebs and the aristocracy. Machiavelli suggests that the disunion of 
plebs and the senate made the Republic of Rome free and powerful. 
He draws a sharp distinction between them and suggests that the 
laws “in favour of freedom “are set by the disunion of the two 
“(Discourses, 1.4, 16). He maintains that the republican constitution 
founded primarily on the power of the people did not last long 
(Gatti 2015, 15). Moreover, freedom calls for tumults and conflicts. 
In Machiavelli’s words: “every city ought to have its modes with 
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MACHIAVELLI AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE CONCEPTION OF 
LIBERTY  
 
Isaiah Berlin’s dualistic framework 
 
As Adam Swift rightly points out, Isaiah Berlin’s essay on the two 
concepts of liberty in which the famous distinction between positive 
and negative conceptions is drawn is the most influential one in 
contemporary political philosophy (Swift 2014, 57). According to 
Berlin, “the positive sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish 
on the part of the individual to be his own master”, to be a “subject”, 
instead of being an “object” (Berlin 2002, 178). The main question 
referring to the positive conception of freedom is: “What, or who, 
is the source of control or interference that can determine someone 
to do, or be, this rather than that?” (Berlin 2002, 169). In contrast, 
he suggests that freedom, in a negative sense, is all about “the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am 
prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to 
that degree unfree” (Berlin 2002, 169). Respectively, the question 
that addresses negative freedom is: “what is the area within which 
the subject (…) is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do 
or be, without interference by other persons?” (Berlin 2002, 169).  
To put it simply, negative freedom (“freedom from”) requires an 
absence of certain types of constraints and interferences, whereas 
positive freedom (“freedom to”) calls for action, thus for the 
fulfilment of certain activities.  
Skinner questions the applicability of this distinction. In his eyes, 
people value freedom as long as they are free from the interferences, 
which would hamper their security4. In other words, people value 
freedom inasmuch as they value their secure lives (Skinner 1984, 
205). Upon Machiavelli’s reasoning, a free city is capable to govern 
itself and is not subject to any constraints. Considering these two 
accounts, Skinner concludes that, for Machiavelli, the enjoyment of 
personal freedom is a possibility that is given only to the members 
of self-governing communities. These are political communities in 
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which “the body politic determines its own actions, the actions of 
community as a whole” (Skinner 1984, 207). From this perspective, 
the positive and negative conceptions of freedom seem to be 
compatible and complementary.  
 
Hanna Arendt and the Notions “Beginning” and “Freedom”  
 
Another author whose works draw on this topic is Hannah Arendt. 
In her essay “What is freedom?”, she points out that raising the 
question about a definition of freedom represents a “hopeless 
enterprise”, given all the controversies and contradictions which are 
bound with this concept (Arendt 1977, 143). She acknowledges, 
however, that discussions on freedom are inevitable in political 
theory (Arendt 1977, 145). As previously stated, Arendt’s endorses 
the political conception of freedom. In her book “On Revolution”, 
freedom and power are conceived as inextricably interrelated 
concepts; they are almost applied as synonyms. People, upon 
Arendt’s reasoning, are capable to act, to establish a new order and 
the power cannot exist separately from them. It only exists when 
people get together and “bind themselves through ‘promises, 
covenants, and mutual pledges’ (Arendt 1990, 181). Needless to say 
that mutual pledges and promises are political categories.  
For Arendt, as well as for Machiavelli, the concept of beginning 
is crucial. She endorses the idea that a human being is the beginning 
itself: “with the creation of man, the principle of beginning came 
into the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying 
that the principle of freedom was created when man was created but 
not before” (Arendt 1990, 177) Freedom, on its side, is all about 
action, it is “primarily experienced in action”(Arendt 1997, 151).  
It should be clear now that Arendt dismisses the negative 
conception and the rise of negative liberties. She maintains that this 
idea, as well as that of limited government, were some of the most 
potent reasons because of which the American Revolution could 
not entirely fulfil its initial goals (Arendt 1990, 144). This is action, 
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through which “something new comes into the world” (Arendt, 
1990, 166).  
Both Machiavelli and Arendt seem to have a deterministic 
approach in this regards. Thus, Machiavelli holds that, for a corrupt 
people, reacquisition of freedom is almost impossible. In Arendt’s 
reading, the American people already constituted a politically and 
legally organized entity before the revolution, unlike the French one, 
which resulted in the success of the American Revolution and the 
failure of its French counterpart. Whereas the inheritance of the 
French one was absolutism, the Americans, in Arendt’s words, “had 
widespread experience in self-government” (Arendt 1990, 157). 
Another obvious similarity is the importance that both 
philosophers bestow upon the beginning and “going extraordinary”. 
However, in sharp contrast with Machiavelli, who justifies the usage 
of violent means, one can see the total negation of violence in 
Arendt’s work. She perceives violence as a “marginal phenomenon 
in the political realm”, which is unable to create the order of political 
freedom (Arendt 1990, 19).  
The seat of power is another important topic. Machiavelli, as we 
already saw, holds that the republican constitution founded only on 
the power of people could not last long. In a similar vein, Arendt 
states that the Americans distinguished the source of power, on the 
one hand, and the source of law, on the other. This was another 
reason for American success. In the case of the French Revolution, 
power and law were believed to have the selfsame source, i.e. the 
people (Arendt 1990, 183). She contends that this understanding 
was fatal to the French Revolution (Arendt 1990, 156).  
I assume, notwithstanding, that the biggest difference between 
Arendt and Machiavelli is that the first dismisses negative liberties 
and the negative conception of freedom as such.  
On the other hand, one cannot place Machiavelli’s understanding 
within Berlin’s categorization of negative and positive liberties. As 
Skinner rightly argues, the negative and positive conceptions of 
freedom are complementary in Machiavelli’s political thought. 
Arendt, on the other hand, explicitly endorses republican, “safely 
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buried” concept of freedom, (Arendt, 1990, 11) which calls for joint 
action. Besides, she dismisses the rise of negative liberties and liberal 
reading of freedom as forbearance and absence of constraints. She 
maintains that the “negative safeguards”, which are intended to limit 
the government’s encroachment, can by no means open “the 
political realm” (Arendt 1990, 69).  
Nevertheless, Arendt herself acknowledges that the founding 
fathers bestowed great importance upon the negative liberties and 
agrees with the necessity of a limited government (Arendt 1990, 
147)5. Although for her, this undoubtedly was a mistake from the 
side of Americans revolutionaries, one can argue that, in the 
American case, positive and negative freedoms were complementary 
and not sharply distinguished. On the one hand, the new political 
realm was created through the action and the exercise of power. On 
the other one, this, to a large extent, served the possibility of 
particular individuals to live in freedom and lead “secure” lives in 
the newly established Body Politic.  
The purpose of this paper was to discuss the Machiavellian 
conception of freedom and its relevance for contemporary debates 
in political philosophy by emphasising Berlin’s famous distinction 
and Arendt’s particular idea of political freedom. This essay can by 
no means be held as exhaustive. However, the Machiavellian 
conception shows that a radical distinction between the positive and 
negative conceptions of freedom does not seem to be prima facie 
evident. Even if one accepts it, their incompatibility and rivalry in 




1.  The difference between the notions of freedom and liberty is a vast subject. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this essay, therefore, these terms are used 
interchangeably in the paper. 
2.   Virtu and Fortuna are two key words in Machiavelli’s philosophy. Virtù, even 
though often translated in English as virtue, actually refers to the range of 
personal qualities that the prince will find it necessary to acquire in order to 
“maintain his state” and to “achieve great things”. Fortuna links virtù with the 
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effective exercise of power. Fortuna, in the sense used by Machiavelli, is a 
malevolent force, the “operational principles” of which the success of 
political processes depends (Nederman 2015). According to Skinner, in the 
fifteenth century political thought, this was exactly the idea fortune, as “an 
inexorable force”, which threatened one’s freedom (Skinner 1981, 27). 
3.  The concept of beginning, which will be elaborated in the second section of 
the essay, is crucial in Hannah Arendt’s philosophy.  
4.  Skinner himself cites Machiavelli’s words: “Desiderano la libertà per vivere 
sicuri” (Skinner 1984, 205). 
5.  Arendt refers to Federalist 51, in which Madison argues that the government 
is a “reflection upon human nature”. 
6.  Atmosphere: In the fiction following the Romantic grotesque period, 
“atmosphere” is used in the sense of setting in order to get a particular effect 
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